158 Years Lost to One Weak Password: A Cybersecurity Wake-Up Call

What happened: A ransomware gang infiltrated KNP’s network by exploiting a single weak password belonging to an employee. Despite claiming compliance with industry standards and having cyber insurance, KNP lacked essential defensive layers and disaster-recovery readiness.

team
Marketing Team
  • Aug 05, 2025

Incident Overview: Knights of Old/KNP Shutdown

What happened: A ransomware gang infiltrated KNP’s network by exploiting a single weak password belonging to an employee.
Despite claiming compliance with industry standards and having cyber insurance, KNP lacked essential defensive layers and disaster-recovery readiness.

Root Causes: Multi-layer Failure

Weak Authentication

  • Attackers gained access via a guessed/cracked password to a privileged or shared account.
  • Lesson: Passwords alone, even complex ones, are insufficient. Without MFA or password less schemes, compromise is straightforward for cybercriminals.

No Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

  • Reddit consensus: “It’s not just the password, it’s lack of 2FA, lack of disaster recovery and lack of Zero Trust”.
  • Without MFA, even stolen credentials allow full access.

Deficient Identity & Access Management (IAM)

  • Lack of least privilege controls meant one compromised account led to lateral movement and ransomware deployment.
  • No “break-glass” or emergency escalation protocols were in place.

Poor Network Segmentation & Lack of Zero Trust

  • Entire network was likely flat or insufficiently segmented, permitting attacker progression.
  • No Zero Trust model to reassess trust at each access attempt.

Insufficient Backups

  • It appears backups were either missing, improperly secured, or untested.

Cultural and Organizational Oversight

  • Management underinvested in cybersecurity: “Security is not and never has been a nice to have.
  • IT was regarded as a cost center, not a critical business enabler

Technical Breakdown: How This Could Have Been Prevented

A layered defense approach would have significantly reduced the blast radius of this attack or stopped it entirely. Below is a detailed look at what controls were missing, how each control works, and how it would have prevented the breach.

1. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

The attacker accessed the network using a weak password. With MFA in place, such as an authenticator app or hardware token, access would have required a second verification step. Even if the password was stolen, MFA would have blocked the login attempt.

Technical Detail:

  • Time-based One-Time Passwords (TOTP), WebAuthn/FIDO2 tokens, or hardware keys like YubiKey enforce authentication beyond credentials.
  • MFA can be enforced at identity provider (IdP) level via SSO solutions like Azure AD, Okta, or Auth0.

2. Least Privilege & Identity Controls

The compromised account had excessive access. Enforcing least privilege through role-based access and time-limited permissions would have restricted access to only necessary systems. The attacker wouldn’t have reached critical infrastructure so easily.

Technical Detail:

  • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) ensures accounts are limited to roles with predefined permissions.
  • Just-in-Time (JIT) access via tools like Microsoft PIM or BeyondTrust limits the time sensitive privileges granted.
  • Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) or jump servers isolate admin functions from general network use.

3. Network Segmentation & Zero Trust

Once inside, the attacker likely moved freely across systems. With network segmentation, they would have been trapped in a single zone. A Zero Trust model would have re-verified every access attempt, stopping lateral movement.

Technical Detail:

  • Microsegmentation with software-defined perimeters (SDPs) using tools like Illumio or Cisco Secure Workload.
  • Software-defined networking (SDN) firewalls with role-aware policies.
  • Conditional Access Policies based on real-time risk scoring.

4. Secure, Immutable Backups

The company had no viable backups to restore from. Using immutable, offline backups (stored in a way they can’t be changed or encrypted by attackers) would have enabled fast recovery without paying ransom or shutting down.

Technical Detail:

  • Immutable storage via Veeam Hardened Repositories, AWS S3 Object Lock, or Rubrik.
  • Automated backup validation and restoration testing.
  • Separation of backup management systems from the primary domain.

5. Endpoint Detection & Monitoring

There were no signs the attack was caught in progress. With EDR tools, abnormal behaviors like unauthorized file access or encryption could have been detected and stopped in real time often before widespread damage.

Technical Detail:

  • Tools like CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint provide kernel-level monitoring.
  • Integration with a SIEM allows correlation across logs, endpoints, and user activity for contextual alerting.

6. Cybersecurity Culture & Accountability

The root problem was organizational: cybersecurity wasn’t taken seriously. Treating it as a core business risk backed by board-level ownership, budget, and training would have driven implementation of all the above protections.

Technical Detail:

  • Simulated phishing programs via KnowBe4 or Microsoft Defender.
  • Metrics-driven cybersecurity KPIs tied to board-level risk dashboards.
  • Designation of a CISO or virtual CISO with direct reporting to the board.

How Ebryx can help?

At Ebryx, our Security as a Service (SECaaS) solution is designed precisely to guard against such weaknesses. Here's how:

  • Continuous Monitoring & Rapid Detection: Our 24/7 SOC monitors your environment to catch suspicious activity early.
  • Vulnerability Management: Automated scans find weak spots like poor passwords and outdated auth methods.
  • Identity and Access Management (IAM): Strict identity checks and access controls prevent credential misuse.
  • Incident Response: Our team acts fast to reduce downtime and limit damage during incidents.

Had such a comprehensive and proactive security framework been in place, the breach and massive loss could likely have been prevented or minimized. Learn more at: https://www.ebryx.com/secaas

Conclusion:

The KNP incident shows how a single weak password, combined with missing basic defenses like MFA, segmentation, and secure backups, can lead to total business failure. This wasn’t just a technical lapse; it was a lack of strategic cyber readiness.
With proper controls in place, the attack could have stopped at the door or been contained quickly.